EchoIA: Implicit Authentication System Based on User Feedback by Yang, Yingyuan et al.
EchoIA: Implicit Authentication System Based on
User Feedback
Yingyuan Yang∗, Xueli Huang‡, Longfei Wu§, and Jinyuan Stella Sun†
∗University of Illinois, Springfield, IL, 62629 USA Email: yyang260@uis.edu
‡Temple University, Philadelphia, PA, 19122 USA Email: tuc36161@temple.edu
§Fayetteville State University, Fayetteville, NC, 28314 USA Email: lwu@uncfsu.edu
†University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37996 USA Email: jysun@utk.edu
Abstract—Implicit authentication (IA) transparently
authenticates users by utilizing their behavioral data sampled
from various sensors. Identifying the illegitimate user through
constantly analyzing current users’ behavior, IA adds another
layer of protection to the smart device. Due to the diversity
of human behavior, the existing research works tend to
simultaneously utilize many different features to identify
users, which is less efficient. Irrelevant features may increase
system delay and reduce the authentication accuracy. However,
dynamically choosing the best suitable features for each user
(personal features) requires a massive calculation, especially in
the real environment. In this paper, we proposed EchoIA to find
personal features with a small amount of calculation by utilizing
user feedback. In the authentication phase, our approach
maintains the transparency, which is the major advantage of IA.
In the past two years, we conducted a comprehensive experiment
to evaluate EchoIA. We compared it with other state-of-the-art
IA schemes in the aspect of authentication accuracy and
efficiency. The experiment results show that EchoIA has better
authentication accuracy (93%) and less energy consumption
(23-hour battery lifetimes) than other IA schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the rapid growth of smart
technologies such as the smartphone, smartglasses, and smart-
watch. On one hand, people rely heavily on smart devices
to share information and to gain services, which become
primary elements of our daily life. On the other hand, however,
the security problem raised by smart devices becomes more
important than ever before. One of the most important issues
is user authentication.
To identify users, most of the existing systems use explicit
approaches (explicit authentication), such as password, PIN,
and draw-pattern. However, explicit authentication requires
user-system interaction, which could be frustrating especially
when the users possess many different passwords. A recent
survey [1] shows 3% percent of people forget a password
at least once a week. Explicit authentication can also be
circumvented and be broken [2]. Researchers begin to study
new authentication methods to enhance explicit authentication.
Utilizing sensors’ data sampled by the smart device, implicit
authentication (IA) transparently identifies users by constantly
comparing current users’ behavioral data with historical le-
gitimate users’ behavioral data. The comparing process, or
classification process, is usually achieved by using various
machine learning models, e.g., SVM. Since users do not need
to interact with the system in the authentication, IA can be
seamlessly applied to various authentication systems, which
adds another layer of protection to the smart device. During
usage, if suspicious behaviors were detected, IA will lock the
device and ask users to perform a multi-factor authentication,
e.g., inputting passwords. From the users’ aspect, due to IA’s
transparency, they will not be able to notice IA until the device
has been locked. In addition, implicit authentication does not
require user-system interaction, which releases users from
tedious passwords inputting and the burden of memorizing
the passwords.
In implicit authentication (IA), the features used for the
authentication are predefined by the system, which will not
be able to change during usage [3]–[5]. To achieve better
coverage in user authentication, the existing approaches tend
to simultaneously use many different features [6]–[8], such
as location, touch, and acceleration for user identification
purposes. However, for a specific user, only a small number
of the features (personal features) in the total feature set
is needed. Irrelevant features not only reduce the system’s
efficiency, but decrease the authentication accuracy as well.
In practice, dynamically finding suitable personal features is
one of the most important problems in implicit authentication.
Due to the high diversity of user behavior, it is difficult to
implement IA in a real environment unless the system can
efficiently find personal features for the current user [9].
Our previous work discussed a way of finding personal
features by analyzing users’ behavioral data [10]. From an-
other aspect, this paper introduces EchoIA, which utilizes
user feedback to pinpoint personal features during the usage
with a small amount of calculation. By comparing with the
current IA schemes, the experiment shows that our method can
significantly improve the authentication accuracy of traditional
IA. In addition, the proposed method is lightweight, which can
be easily embedded into the existing IA systems as an add-on
to achieve efficient authentication. As far as we know, we are
the first group, which utilizes user feedback to improve the
authentication accuracy and energy efficiency in IA.
The major advantage of implicit authentication (IA) is its
transparency, which releases users from the tedious authen-
tication process. It is difficult to gather user feedback in a
transparent environment, since directly asking users’ input
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Fig. 1: EchoIA overview. (a) The Initialization phase. (b) The Authentication phase.
will break the transparency. Even though we may have user
feedback, to successfully pinpoint the best suitable features
is also a hard task. To this end, we proposed a method that
utilizes the correct rate of inputted passwords to find personal
features during usage.
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We proposed EchoIA to find the best suitable features
(personal features) for each user by utilizing user feedback.
EchoIA maintains the transparency of implicit authentication,
while can choose personal features for legitimate users based
on their recent behavior.
• We implemented EchoIA in a real environment by using
the Android system and multiple servers. To evaluate the
proposed method, we also implemented four state-of-the-art
implicit authentication schemes.
• We collected users’ behavioral data in the past two
years. In addition, we evaluated the proposed method in the
aspect of authentication accuracy, computational efficiency,
and energy efficiency. In the experiment, EchoIA has a better
authentication accuracy and a lower energy cost.
II. THE SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Implicit authentication (IA) identifies users by constantly
comparing current users’ behavioral data with legitimate users’
historical behavioral data. If current users’ behavioral data
is different, IA will lock the device and ask the users to
input passwords. Due to the noise and behavioral change, it is
common that legitimate users are falsely blocked by the device
[9]. In implicit authentication, if users input correct passwords,
they can continue to use the device, where the setting of the
original IA system will not change. In EchoIA, however, if
users input correct passwords and prove their identities, the
system will not only unlock the device, but may also adjust
the features to align with legitimate users’ behavior.
As shown in Fig. 1, EchoIA contains two phases, Initial-
ization and Authentication. The Initialization phase only takes
place for the first time of the usage. Meanwhile, we assume
the users at the Initialization phase are legitimate. In the
Initialization phase, candidate features are sent to legitimate
users, who may rank the features based on their behavior.
The combination of top-ranking features and system-default
features is used as personal features to identify users. Note
that the personal features are dynamically adjusted according
to different users and devices. In the Authentication phase,
EchoIA utilizes the correct rate of inputted passwords to adjust
personal features. Specifically, user feedback is implicitly
obtained through the process of inputting passwords (Section
II-A), which keeps IA’s transparency. However, to prevent
illegitimate users take advantage of the system, it only updates
personal features after users entered a correct PIN number,
which must be different from passwords used for unlocking
the device. A secured channel is established to transmit data
between client and server. We adopted Wind Vane module [9]
to optimize the data transmission efficiency.
From the system point of view, inputting incorrect pass-
words will enhance its confidence in using existing personal
features; inputting correct passwords will reduce its confidence
in using existing personal features and will encourage it to
choose different features. Since most of the time the system is
running at the Authentication phase, the users will not be able
to notice the existence of EchoIA during usage. The following
sections will discuss the detail of the Initialization phase and
the Authentication phase.
A. The Initialization Phase
As its name suggests, the Initialization phase mainly focuses
on initializing personal features and associated system settings.
The users will spend a short time in this phase in order to help
the system to prepare the authentication.
As shown in Fig. 1 (a), at the Initialization phase, EchoIA
will send a message contains all candidate features to the users.
Based on their own behavior, the users will rank candidate
features, where the result will be sent back to the remote
servers for further processing. For each feature, there is an
associated weight parameter, which will be initialized at this
phase. The total available features in the smart device are F .
Note that the elements in F are various for different devices,
and can be updated during the usage once new features are
introduced.
F = {f1, f2, f3, ..., fn} (1)
To ensure reliability, some of the features are system
preserved, which is not shown in F . For example, a touch
trajectory feature is preserved since it has high accuracy when
identifying most of the users. For each feature in F , the
corresponding weight is predefined in W .
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W = {w1, w2, w3, ..., wn} (2)
The users may rank the features based on their routine. To
this end, EchoIA will renew the weight for each feature based
on the users’ ranking.
wn =
1
rn
, (3)
where wn is the weight of the nth feature; and rn is the
associated ranking of the feature. The top-ranking features
only contain a part of elements in F . For example, the top-
ranking features, Ftop, may only contain 5 different features
Ftop = {f2, f4, f5, f7, f8} ⊂ F . Personal features in this
example will have both Ftop and system reserved features.
In real usage, users may change their behavior, which is
common in practice. To better identify the users, the system
also needs to adjust personal features according to the behav-
ioral change. The details of adjusting personal features will be
discussed in the next section.
B. The Authentication Phase
To dynamically adjust personal features, the system can
directly send the message to users to request new features,
but this approach will break IA’s transparency. In addition, it
is difficult for the system to decide the “right time” to send the
request, since the system will not know the behavioral change
unless it analyzed the data. In EchoIA, instead of analyzing
users’ behavioral data, the system leverages the correct rate of
inputted passwords to dynamically adjust personal features.
At the Authentication phase, as shown in Fig. 1 (b), the
system will reduce the weights of each feature in Ftop if
users input correct passwords. Since users only need to in-
put passwords when IA locks the device, correct passwords
indicate current users have a large chance of being legitimate.
Similarly, the system will increase the weight of each feature
in Ftop if users input incorrect passwords. The new weight is
updated by δn.
δn = δ
(I)
n − δ(C)n , (4)
where δ(I)n is the amount of weight increased for the feature n
in Ftop; δ
(C)
n is the amount of weight decreased for the feature
n in Ftop. The new weight of the feature n is calculated by
wn + δn.
In EchoIA, a predefined threshold ∆ is used to measure the
significance of the weight change. If the change is significant,
δn > ∆, the system will challenge the users to input a PIN
number, which is the number different from passwords used to
unlock the device. The users can choose the PIN number at the
Initialization phase. If the users type a correct PIN and agree
with personal features’ change, EchoIA will update personal
features according to the new weights in Ftop. The system
will use the updated personal features to identify the users until
δn > ∆ again. We adopted the support vector machine (SVM)
to achieve the user classification and to identify legitimate
users. The parameters in the model are optimized by using
k-fold cross-validation.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented EchoIA by using the Android system and
multiple servers. The system architecture is shown in Fig. 2.
The data collection is achieved at the user-end, in which an
application is created to collect users’ behavioral data. The
user-end application constantly samples users’ behavioral data
from various sensors and sends it to the Control Server by
using a secured channel. As shown in Fig. 2, multiple users
can connect with the Control Server at the same time. The
Control Server contains three main components, Control Unit,
Authentication Unit, and Message Unit. As mentioned in sec-
tion II, the Control Unit is responsible for updating the weight
parameter associated with each feature. The Authentication
Unit leverages implicit authentication to constantly monitor
users’ behavior and compare it with legitimate users’ historical
behavior. In order to compare EchoIA with other IA schemes,
we also implemented four state-of-the-art IA schemes in the
Authentication Unit, called Shi-IA [11], [12], Multi-Sensor-
IA [6], Gait-IA [13], and SilentSense-IA [14]. Finally, the
Message Unit is used to communicate with users during the
Initialization phase and the Authentication phase. All users’
data is formatted and stored in the Database Server.
User 1
…
.
User 2
User N
Control Server
Database Server
Control Unit
Authentication
Message
Fig. 2: The system architecture of EchoIA.
Written by java, the user-end application is installed in two
types of smart devices, Motorola G2 with the Android system
version of 6.0 and Samsung Galaxy S10 with the Android
version of 9.0. The Motorola G2 has 1GB memory, 8GB local
storage, a Quad-core 1.2 GHz CPU, and Adreno 305 GPU. The
Samsung Galaxy S10 has 8GB memory, 128GB local storage,
an Octa-core 1.95 GHz CPU, and Adreno 640 GPU. The
Control Server has a Qual-core 2.4GHz CPU, 16GB memory,
500GB local storage, and an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 660M
GPU. We adopted Google Firebase as the remote database
server, which is a NoSQL database and can easily store more
than thousands of users’ encrypted data. A program written
by JavaScript is used to achieve data transmission.
The user-end application and the server-end database are
shown in Fig. 3 (a) and (b) respectively. The red rectangle in
Fig. 3 (a) indicates candidate features sent from the Control
Server. The user interface is shown under the message pop-
up, in which the legitimate user can rank candidate features
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by using the GUI provided by the application. The user-end
application also shows the behavioral data associated with each
feature, e.g., light strength 2.0, longitude -83.92, and latitude
35.95. The sampling frequency is dynamically controlled for
energy-saving purposes [9]. As shown in Fig. 3 (b), users’ data
is stored in the database server as Jason files, in each of which
contains the data sampled from a smart device. For example,
Fig. 3 (b) shows the data sampled from a smart device with an
ID of L9ed8NEiPN7pYN8XISM. The data is stored based on
the time stamp. Note that the sensitive data is hashed before
send to the Control Server.
 
(a)
 
(b)
Fig. 3: EchoIA implementation. (a) The user-end application.
(b) The server-end database.
IV. EVALUATION
In the real experiment, we tracked the usage of 17 par-
ticipants during the past two years. Each user was in turn
selected as the legitimate user, while another user was deemed
as illegitimate users. Illegitimate users were required to use
the device more than 10% of the total usage time. Utilizing
our system, we gathered rich information from all users
under different environments. In the experiment, we mainly
use the following 12 features to achieve user authentication:
accelerometer, orientation, magnetometer, gyroscope, touch,
light, pressure, temperature, GPS, microphone, battery usage,
and wifi status.
To compare EchoIA with other state-of-the-art IA schemes
[15], we implemented Shi-IA [11], Multi-Sensor-IA [6], Gait-
IA [16], and SilentSense-IA [14]. We used the recommended
settings of the original papers [6], [11], [14], [16] in the
experiment. In addition, the feature selection strictly follows
the descriptions of the original works, while the parameters
were optimized by using k-fold cross-validation. Finally, we
tested the performance of different schemes by using the same
data.
In the experiment, we evaluated the authentication accuracy,
CPU utilization, memory utilization, and energy consumption
for each IA schemes, including EchoIA. The experiment
details are described in the following sections.
A. Authentication Accuracy
We first compared the authentication accuracy of different
IA schemes, where results are shown in Fig. 4. In the figure,
users’ data was divided into ten parts based on the timeline.
The first part of the data was used to train the models 1.
We then calculated the authentication accuracies for different
schemes by using the rest parts of the data. The authentication
accuracy was calculated by ACC = TR+TATR+TA+FR+FA , where
true accept (TA) indicates the legitimate user has been cor-
rectly identified; the false reject (FR) indicates the legitimate
user has been incorrectly identified to be the illegitimate user;
the true reject (TR) indicates the illegitimate user has been
correctly identified; the false accept (FA) indicates the illegit-
imate user has been incorrectly identified to be the legitimate
user. We also adopted the retraining techniques discussed in
our previous work [17] to improve the authentication accuracy
for all five schemes.
EchoIA has the highest authentication accuracy in most of
the tests, as shown in Fig. 4. Multi-Sensor-IA also has a high
authentication accuracy compared to other IA schemes. In the
experiment, most of the schemes reach to more than 90%
accuracy after using 80% of the data except SilentSense-IA.
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Fig. 4: Accuracies for different IA schemes.
In EchoIA, we calculated an average authentication accu-
racy for 17 users by utilizing all the data spanned two years.
The result is shown in Fig. 5, where the average accuracy
across all users is 93.23%.
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Fig. 5: The accuracy for each user.
B. CPU Utilization and Memory Utilization
In addition, we evaluated the CPU usage and memory
usage for different schemes. In the experiment, we recorded
the CPU utilization of different IA schemes at three stages,
1The first parts contain 15% of the total data since the training data of this
size optimizes the authentication accuracy across all five IA schemes.
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Start, Sampling, and Authentication. The experiment results
are shown in Fig. 6 (a). At the Sampling stage, the CPU
utilization of EchoIA is the second-lowest for all five schemes.
At the Authentication stage, the CPU utilization of EchoIA is
the lowest among all the schemes. Since most of the time
the users are at the Authentication stage, the total amount
of CPU utilization of EchoIA is the smallest for all the
schemes. In the experiment, Multi-Sensor-IA has the highest
CPU utilization, but it also has a high authentication accuracy
similar to EchoIA.
We recorded the memory utilization of various schemes at
different stages. The result is shown in Fig. 6 (b), in which the
EchoIA has the lowest memory utilization among all the five
schemes. Since EchoIA only uses a small portion of features to
train the model and to authenticate users, the total amount of
memory used to store the data is smaller than other schemes.
As shown in Fig. 6 (b), the memory utilization of Multi-
Sensor-IA is the highest since it uses all the features and
associated sensors’ data on the device.
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Fig. 6: CPU Utilization and Memory Utilization (User-End).
(a) CPU utilization. (b) Memory utilization. *At the Starting
stage, the user-end application and services begin to launch. At the Sampling
stage, sensors’ data is sampled and periodically uploaded to the server. The
Initialization phase is at the Sampling stage. At the authentication stage,
utilizing the model returned from the server, the current user will be classified
into two categories, legitimate or illegitimate. The Authentication phase is at
this stage.
In the experiment, we evaluated the battery consumption
for different schemes. The result is shown in Fig. 7. We
measure the battery usage of different schemes by calculating
the average working hours of battery after fully charged. As
shown in Fig. 7 (a), EchoIA has the longest battery lifetime,
23 hours on average. The Multi-Sensor-IA has the shortest
battery lifetime, four hours on average.
We also calculated the average battery lifetime of each
participant by using EchoIA. Fig. 7 (b) shows the battery
lifetime derived from seven different participants’ data ran-
domly selected from 17 users. There are large differences in
the battery utilization between users. As shown in the figure,
participant 2 has the shortest battery lifetime, which is 16
hours. Participant 7, however, has the longest battery lifetime,
which is 30 hours.
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Fig. 7: Battery Utilization. (a) Battery utilization of dif-
ferent schemes. M.S. denotes Multi-Sensor-IA. S.S. denotes
SilentSense-IA. (b) Battery utilization of different participants.
C. Energy Consumption of the User-End Application
We also tracked the performance of the user-end applica-
tion. In the experiment, we compared EchoIA with popular
applications, such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, eBay,
and LinkedIn. We continuously tracked CPU utilization and
memory utilization for different applications during usage.
The result is shown in Table I. Please note that in Fig. 6,
we calculated the CPU and battery utilization only based on
the data at the sampling and authentication stages. In Table I,
we also gathered data from other stages, e.g., switching to a
different application.
TABLE I: CPU and Memory Consumption
Insta.* F.B. Twit. L.In eBay EchoIA.
CPU Avg% 7.1 11.6 6.0 5.9 5.3 1.3
CPU Max% 10.0 16.5 10.3 9.6 8.6 3.9
Mem.
Max(MB) 121.2 157.0 101.4 138.2 111.6 103
*The abbreviation Insta. is for Instagram, F.B. for Facebook, Twit. for Twitter,
L.In for LinkedIn.
Table I shows the average and maximum CPU consump-
tion for each application. EchoIA has the lowest average
CPU consumption compared to other applications, which is
1.3%. Similarly, EchoIA also has the lowest maximum CPU
consumption, which is 3.9%. EchoIA also consumes a small
amount of memory in real usage, which only occupies a
maximum of 103MB memory.
V. RELATED WORK
To improve explicit authentication mechanisms such as PIN
and passlocks, various implicit authentication schemes have
been proposed as secondary authentication mechanisms [6],
[8], [11], [13], [14], [18]–[22]. Among them, leveraging differ-
ent features, Shi scheme [11], Multi-Sensor scheme [6], Gait
scheme [13], and SilentSense scheme [14] are four different
schemes that represent four research directions of state-of-
the-art implicit authentications [15], [23]. In addition, current
implicit authentication research tends to adopt all the available
features to achieve better authentication accuracy [6], [9], [10].
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On one hand, due to the high complexity of users’ behavior,
utilizing only a specific behavior metric is not sufficient to
identify them in practice. On the other hand, to identify a
specific user, only a small portion of the total behavior metrics
is needed [6], [8], [10]–[12], [15]. Reducing the number of
features can also exponentially decrease the system’s energy
and time consumption [24]. However, to find personal features
requires additional calculation [6], [9], which increases time
and energy consumption. Leveraging user feedback, EchoIA
can select the best suitable features for different users. During
usage, the legitimate users can also notify the system to update
personal features if their behavior changed, e.g., injury.
Most of the existing research in implicit authentication uti-
lizes the support vector machine (SVM) [6], [14], [25]–[27] to
identify users. Other classifiers, e.g., Gaussian mixture model
(GMM), have also been used in implicit authentication [11].
In EchoIA, we adopted SVM to achieve user authentication,
but our approach is also compatible with other classifiers, such
as kNN, LDA topic model, and GMM [24].
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed EchoIA to find the best suitable features (per-
sonal features) for different users by utilizing user feedback.
To achieve better coverage, the existing works in implicit
authentication tend to use many different features to identify
users, which is less efficient and may decrease the authen-
tication accuracy. Without using additional calculations, it is
difficult to dynamically choose personal features due to the
transparency of IA. Leveraging the correct rate of inputted
passwords, EchoIA implicitly gathers user feedback to choose
personal features, while maintaining the transparency of IA. To
evaluate the proposed method, we implemented EchoIA and
four state-of-the-art IA schemes by using the Android system
and multiple servers. The results show that EchoIA has better
authentication accuracy (93%) and less energy consumption
(23-hour battery lifetimes) than other IA schemes. In the fu-
ture, to benefit associated research, we will share the system’s
source code, parameter setting, and dataset on our lab website.
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